The pattern has been too obvious, attacks, response and tepid reconciliation over the last four years – But what is new to this triangular conflict between Pakistan, Afghanistan and Non State Actors is that later has brought both countries to the verge of war, a conflict that well surpasses tihe borders now, even though its epicenter remains a fragile border, involving regional and global power brokers.

These hostilities escalated following an aerial strike in Kabul, the capital of Afghanistan, hitherto unchartered territory followed by a spate of further airstrikes into Paktika on the night of October 9, 2025. Acknowledgement for the strikes came much later by Pakistan but the Taliban after an 8-hour silence not only responded by a fiery statement but through the barrel. In-fact the Taliban retaliated with full might on 27 points across the 2,604 kilometers border between both the countries. Pakistan responded not only but once again bombed, Kandahar, Kabul and Paktika.

The guarantors of the Doha peace deal for the Taliban, Qatar, was the first to jump in, asking both countries to raise the white flag, followed by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the new defense ally of Pakistan. But what was significant is that despite the fact both countries were attacking each other, the prime drivers of the conflict, the Pakistani Taliban continued to carry out attacks against Pakistan.

A cease fire was brokered on October 19 after two days of negotiations in Doha between Pakistan and Afghanistan, mediated by Qatar and Türkiye. Both sides agreed to uphold peace and respect and resolve disputes through dialogue. While the second round of talks will take place in Istanbul, there have been rejoinders, endorsements and clarifications from Afghanistan, casting doubtful shadows over a sustainable peace.

Clemenson University Professor Dr. Amira Jadoon told The Khorasan Diary, that the Pakistani's strikes represent classic hybrid coercion, which includes a combination of military force with other types of pressure, such as border controls and trade restrictions and refugee expulsion, with the aim of raising concerns over the Pakistani Taliban's activity within Afghan political environment.

However, Dr. Jadoon stressed that the main flaw behind this approach is that it works better against reasonable opponents, not ideologically rigid ones, deeply tied to shared history, religious and tribal background.

"Pakistan is applying pressure tactics to an actor whose decisions are still largely driven by ideological solidarity rather than pragmatic assessments. These strikes once again expose the failure of Pakistan's fundamental assumption that the Afghan Taliban would reciprocate for decades of support."

Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Non-State Actors

The primary actors involved in the ongoing conflict are Pakistan, Afghanistan, and the Non State Actors largely affiliated with the Pakistani Taliban antagonistic to Pakistan’s armed forces. Each party maintains distinct perspectives which underscore the fundamental dynamics driving the conflict, as well as the critical boundaries whose violation has prompted significant responses from the opposing side.

Pakistan maintains that its concerns stem from the view that the Taliban administration has not effectively addressed anti-state groups operating within Afghanistan and is also providing support to these groups in actions directed against Pakistan. Between September and October, various factions of the Pakistani Taliban conducted multiple large-scale attacks, along with ongoing low-intensity ones, which led to at least a hundred fatalities amongst Pakistan’s civil and military law enforcement forces.

On September 13, an attack attributed to the TTP resulted in the deaths of 12 Pakistani security forces personnel in South Waziristan. Subsequently, on September 29, another TTP-related incident in South Waziristan led to the loss of 9 security personnel. On September 30, a further attack involving the TTP caused the deaths of 9 security forces members in Quetta. Additionally, on October 8, a day prior to the airstrikes, a separate TTP attack in the Kurram region resulted in the fatalities of 16 security personnel.

The airstrikes carried out by Pakistan were undertaken in response to mounting local pressure from within Pakistan and Islamabad’s frustration with Kabul’s non-compliance. Furthermore, the circulation of an online video allegedly showing members of the Afghan Taliban desecrating the body of a Pakistani paramilitary Frontier Corps soldier contributed significantly to the decision to target locations within the Afghan capital, Kabul once again.

A contributing factor to the crisis emerged during the seven-day visit of Interim Taliban Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi to India. During this visit, Muttaqi's remarks characterising terrorism as an internal matter for Pakistan, combined with a joint Afghanistan-India statement concerning Jammu and Kashmir, intensified Pakistan’s strategic apprehensions about potential encirclement from both the eastern and western fronts due to possible alliances between its neighbouring countries. While the warming of ties between India and the Taliban remains largely rhetorical and focused on economic cooperation, drawing on established connections between Delhi and the former Afghan republic, the joint statement conveyed Afghanistan’s shared security concerns with India, which was perceived as particularly antagonistic by watchers in Islamabad.

Afghanistan’s current approach is defined by its effort to navigate a complex landscape that requires balancing multiple priorities. On one hand, the Taliban-led government seeks international recognition and security assurances to fortify its legitimacy and stability. On the other hand, it is compelled to preserve its long-standing ideological and historical connections with the Pakistani Taliban, which remain a critical component of its internal and regional strategy.

In this context, Afghanistan’s increasing engagement with India reflects a calculated move to overcome its diplomatic isolation. This outreach has gained momentum particularly after Russia’s formal recognition of the Taliban-led Afghan interim government in July, making Russia the first state to do so. The Taliban perceives strategic cooperation with India as an effective counterbalance to Pakistan’s influence in the region. By cultivating bilateral relations with India, Afghanistan attempts to reduce its vulnerability to perceived kinetic threats from Pakistan, particularly those arising from cross-border attacks attributed to Pakistani Taliban factions.

Ultimately, this diplomatic initiative is designed to build a coalition of supportive nations that can advocate for Afghanistan’s interests internationally and strengthen its position in bilateral negotiations. The Taliban hopes that such alliances will not only provide avenues for international recognition but also serve as a buffer against security challenges posed by its adversaries in the region.

New Divisions Amongst Old ‘Friends’

In Pakistan, divisions within the Deoband school of thought regarding support for the Taliban have become increasingly apparent. Recently, prominent Pakistani Deobandi scholars have not only distanced themselves from the Taliban but have also begun to publicly criticise them and reject their ideological position concerning Jihad in Pakistan. This shift includes religious political figures, such as the JUI-F leadership, as well as
distinguished non-political scholars who previously were among the most committed supporters of the Taliban in Afghanistan.

During the 2000s, these scholars constituted a crucial element of the ideological support base, recruiting members from their respective seminaries and serving as a vital lifeline for both the Pakistani and Afghan Taliban. Currently, only a few Pakistani religious scholars continue to vocally support the Pakistani Taliban, with Maulana Abdul Aziz Ghazi of Islamabad's Red Mosque being a notable exception. Ghazi's stance has led to his isolation within Pakistan's Deoband scholarship community, which has rejected his warlike rhetoric. In an interview with The Khorasan Diary in 2023, Ghazi clearly articulated his support for the Pakistani Taliban, expressing his expectation that they will enter Islamabad and impose a Taliban-like government. As historically, Pakistan served as a safe base for fueling the Taliban-led insurgency in Afghanistan, today the Taliban - both Afghan and Pakistani - are poised to lose their historical support base in the country, in terms of ideological support, recruitment, and supply line.

Conversely, a distinct phenomenon has emerged in Afghanistan. Narratives promoted by Taliban officials and their supporters, particularly within the digital sphere, following recent border clashes between Pakistan and Afghanistan have highlighted an increase in Afghan nationalist sentiment, as opposed to overtly Islamist rhetoric that typically transcends ethnic and national boundaries. This development is significant, as it has garnered backing from non-Taliban Afghan groups, including members of the anti-Taliban diaspora who united under Afghanistan’s flag in opposition to Pakistan, motivated by nationalist and historical considerations.

In parallel, while Pakistan's Deobandi scholars have predominantly supported Pakistan, Muttaqi's visit to India's Darul Uloom Deoband may have facilitated the Taliban in obtaining ideological backing from the Indian Deobandi community, potentially offering an alternative to Pakistan’s influence. The cordial reception extended to Muttaqi by Indian Deobandi scholars enhanced the Taliban’s public image and legitimacy, serving as a counterbalance to their traditional ties with Pakistan’s Deobandi establishment. By seeking diverse sources of religious legitimacy, the Taliban has temporarily secured ideological and political support within India. Nonetheless, Darul Uloom Deoband has faced increasing challenges in maintaining autonomy and expressing independent viewpoints, particularly on topics concerning jihad and Islamic governance, following the rise of the BJP. Furthermore, certain social media accounts affiliated with the ruling party have urged the Indian government to exercise caution regarding access granted to the Taliban Foreign Minister at Deoband, citing apprehensions about the potential promotion of extremist ideologies.

The final dimension of the conflict arises from the ongoing disputes between Pakistan and Afghanistan, particularly regarding the Pakistani Taliban and other militant groups, which Pakistan alleges operating primarily from Afghan territory. These groups continue to exert significant pressure on the security apparatus of Pakistan, attacking them consistently while retaining operational bases in Afghanistan. Both the Pakistani Taliban and Baloch militant organizations are leveraging existing political, social, and economic vulnerabilities within Pakistan to advance their agendas by crafting situational narratives.

Senior Pakistani officials have alleged that, since August 2021, the Afghan Taliban have utilised Pakistani Taliban and Baloch armed separatists as proxies against Pakistan. There is a growing perception within Pakistan that, should the Taliban persist with anti-Pakistan activities via proxy groups, Pakistan could reciprocate in kind. Beyond existing anti-Taliban factions such as the National Resistance Front (NRF), Pakistan may also consider the potential of recruiting former Afghan Republic military personnel, including US- and NATO-trained Afghan special forces, who might be inclined to act against the Taliban if provided support.

Kinetics, Optics and Deepening Fissures

Pakistan's airstrikes in Kabul and Bermal on October 9, and in Argun on October 17, demonstrate its capability and willingness to retaliate deep within Afghanistan, targeting even politically sensitive areas like Kabul.

On October 17, Pakistan conducted airstrikes that resulted in the killing of Abdul Sattar Mutasim, a prominent commander of the TTG faction, Jaish al-Mahdi in North Waziristan, as he was returning from Khost, Afghanistan. In recent months, Pakistani security forces have neutralized several fighting units of the Pakistani Taliban through various counter-terrorism operations during border crossings into Pakistan, inside Pakistan. An improvement in ground intelligence within Pakistan has been witnessed in recent months for Pakistani security forces, leading to more effective security measures. Conversely, Pakistan continues to face significant challenges in gathering ground intelligence on anti-Pakistan militants in Afghanistan, as demonstrated by its inability to eliminate senior Pakistani Taliban leaders in a range of airstrikes carried out in Afghanistan over the past few years.

The recent border clashes may prompt Pakistan to reinforce its border defenses, deploying its full spectrum of conventional forces, including air bases, in regions close to the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, to counter future security threats emanating from Afghanistan. During the recent conflict with Afghanistan, the Taliban's retaliation remained largely confined to the border area, while Pakistan demonstrated its capability to strike deep inside Afghanistan with ease. This significant conventional military disparity between the two nations may push the Taliban to settle scores with Pakistan through a web of proxy elements, including both the Pakistani Taliban and Baloch armed separatists.

Meanwhile, Pakistani Taliban continued their attacks, including three large-scale involving multiple suicide attackers in Pakistan during the Pakistan-Afghanistan clashes and the 48-hour temporary ceasefire. In Dera Ismail Khan district, the TTP deployed several suicide bombers against a police facility while claiming responsibility through the newly established Tehreek-e-Tahaffuz Imarat-e-Islami Force (Movement in Defense of the Islamic Emirate). In North Waziristan and Bannu districts, two factions of the Hafuz Gul Bahadar conglomerate, Jaish-e-Fursan-e-Muhammad (JFM) and Jabhat Ansar al-Mahdi Khorsan (JAMK) fielded multiple suicide bombers backed by armed quadcopters in attacks against security forces installations. These attacks prompted Pakistan to launch new airstrikes in Paktika province even during the ceasefire. These large-scale attacks by Pakistani Taliban are in addition to daily, low-intensity attacks, such as sniper attacks, IEDs, firing raids and kidnapping of security forces personnel; for instance, between October 9 and 19, the TTP claimed more than a hundred attacks of such nature, exerting continuous pressure on Pakistan security forces.

These incidents represent an evolution in Pakistan’s approach to responding to Pakistani Taliban activities. Pakistani government officials have stated that future large-scale attacks within Pakistan will result in retaliatory measures directed at Afghanistan, rather than solely targeting Pakistani Taliban groups based in Afghanistan.

About the cross border militnats’ movements, according to senior Pakistani officials, Pakistani Taliban fighting units are extensively using the Zhob corridor, in addition to the former FATA routes, for both cross-border movements between Afghanistan and Pakistan, as well as domestic movements within Balochistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and Punjab.

The Zhob district in Balochistan shares borders with Afghanistan at Sambaza and north-western Kakar Khurasan, Lower Waziristan in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and several districts in Balochistan, including Sherani, Musakhel, Duki, Loralai, and Killa Saifullah. The Sambaza region serves as a key transit point with Afghanistan. Typically, Taliban fighters cross the fenced border area of Gustoi Union Council, move through Sherani district, and access Dera Ismail Khan, Lower Waziristan, and Tank districts in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, ultimately reaching Dera Ghazi Khan district in Punjab.

The relentless Pakistani Taliban attacks and consequent Pakistani security forces' countermeasures, and now with the rising tension along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, have heightened the fear and uncertainty among locals. While the tribal region enjoyed a period of relative calm from 2015 to 2020, recent events have reignited concerns and uncertainty among the community. The worsening law and order situation in parts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan result in periodic protests, with residents demanding more effective government action to address their grievances and restore peace.

Militants have effectively leveraged local dynamics and the prevailing trust deficit between residents and state authorities to advance their interests through widespread propaganda efforts. Additionally, insufficient coordination and support between the provincial Khyber Pakhtunkhwa government and the federal government regarding militancy significantly contribute to ongoing uncertainty and instability in the region’s law and order situation.

The Perceived Closure

The swift intervention of international mediators, Qatar and Türkiye, in a neutral setting, yielded immediate results, leading to an effective ceasefire and the continuation of negotiations between Pakistan and Afghanistan over a range of contentious issues. However, the sustainability of these arrangements remains uncertain, as the situation on the ground remains unchanged, with the Pakistani Taliban continuing to carry out attacks with the same intensity and pace.

These latest developments make one aspect crystal clear: Pakistan has substantially lost its traditional influence over the Taliban, specifically since the Taliban came into power, as their dependency on Pakistan for refuge and logistical support during their 20-year insurgency has ended. The situation has escalated to the point where Pakistan is now using force to persuade the Taliban to listen to its legitimate concerns, a scenario that would have been unimaginable in the past.

In the recent past, Pakistan even engaged China to convince the Taliban government to address Pakistan’s concerns regarding the use of Afghan soil for attacks in Pakistan, but with little progress to show. Currently, Qatar remains the only country maintaining its influence over the Taliban, specifically its Kandahari faction. Recent precedents indicate that, through Qatari mediation, both the United States and the United Kingdom have successfully convinced the Taliban to free their nationals held in captivity.

Türkiye's strong ties with Pakistan and Afghanistan and its active role in Middle Eastern geopolitics, especially in Syria, make it a key participant in current negotiations. It hosted the second round of talks on October 25, following initial progress in Doha.

Türkiye has been actively trying to act as a mediator in areas of disagreement and conflict since the 2000s, according to independent researcher Cagatay Cebe. Its mediation efforts date back to 2009, during Iran's nuclear talks with the West. Since then, Türkiye has played an important role in resolving conflicts, including Syria, Russia-Ukraine, and the Gaza-Israel war.

Türkiye's Intelligence Chief, İbrahim Kalın, was also present in Doha during the Pakistan-Afghanistan talks. "Before becoming head of intelligence, MIT Chief İbrahim Kalın was a respected and well-known academic who conducted research on the Islamic world, which may have helped him contribute to establishing peace through 'intelligence diplomacy.' On the other hand, as he was also President Erdoğan's advisor on security issues and the spokesperson for the Presidency previously, the relationships he established during this role may have helped him as an official directly involved in peace processes when he became head of intelligence," argued Cebe, who tracks jihadist movements and Türkiye's military policy in the Middle East.

However, there are reasons to remain skeptical that the tension between the two countries will settle down anytime soon, as the Pakistani Taliban continue to carry out large-scale attacks in Pakistan. Furthermore, the Afghan Taliban have so far shown no indication that they will restrain the Pakistani Taliban from carrying out attacks in Pakistan. Therefore, while the Pakistani side continues to engage the Taliban on a bilateral and international level through political-diplomatic efforts, diplomacy might be derailed by the Pakistani Taliban's continuous violent acts and Pakistan's retaliations.

The Executive Director of The Soufan Center, Colin Clarke highlighted that diplomacy could help end the conflict between the two countries, at least in the short term. "Over the long run," stated Clarke, "the grievances still remain, as do the motivations of each side to continue functioning as an adversary of the other. Many of these links, particularly for the Afghan Taliban, are ideological in nature, and so they are less likely to be assuaged by diplomatic outreach."

Even if the second round of talks in Turkey on October 25 yields a bilateral agreement between Pakistan and Afghanistan addressing cross-border infiltration, a significant decrease in militant activities in Pakistan is unlikely out come in the immediate aftermath. Sources suggest the Pakistani Taliban have a strategy to sustain its operational infrastructure for at least six months using existing networks.