In early December last year, Turkey announced the arrest of two Islamic State (IS) militants accused of plotting an attack inside the country on New Year’s Eve. The detained persons, said to be foreign nationals from Uzbekistan and Tajikistan with links to IS’s Khorasan chapter, were caught after they tried to escape police in Istanbul. The Tajik, Abu Maimun, is described as an improvised explosives expert, trainer of jihadists in battlefield tactics, and producer of propaganda for social media. Turk authorities claim the plot was modeled after the January 1, 2017 nightclub shooting in Istanbul. Notably, the perpetrator of the said attack, Abdulkadir Masharipov, was also of Central Asian descent — an Uzbek national to be precise — while another suspect deemed complicit was later arrested in Kyrgyzstan.
In the months prior to these arrests, additional signs of apparent linkages between the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) and IS networks in Turkey were surfacing that involved recruitment, logistics, and fundraising. In August, the Afghan Taliban’s General Directorate of Intelligence (GDI) said it had apprehended an ISKP operative overseeing fundraising, weapons procurement, and travel facilitation of fighters via routes including the that from Turkey to Iran. These connections are more profound in the domain of propaganda activities targeting Turkey with the pro-Islamic State Turkish language media foundation Meydan Medya frequently featured on a number of pro-ISKP channels. For example, ISKP channels in the Uzbek language regularly upload publications and audio statements from Meydan Medya highlighting how ISKP mouthpiece Al-Azaim is serving as a platform for amplifying propaganda in the Turkish language or, more often, in the Uzbek language directed against the Turkish state. At the same time, Meydan Medya channels share ISKP magazines like Voice of Khorasan, Khorasan Ghag, and Sawt-al Khorasan, and archive them together with its own publications.
IS Khorasan – Turkey Connection
The original Meydan Medya-produced propaganda is frequently shared in ISKP Uzbek and Tajik channels. This comprises of short pamphlets targeting Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, his government, and its involvement in Syria and Iraq. The common theme in criticism of Erdogan is that he has turned Turkey into an even more secular state in the garb of being religious — a similar argument that ISKP holds against the Taliban.
However, the propaganda holds Erdogan responsible for allowing Peshmerga forces and Free Syrian Army units into Kobane with full support, arguing that Erdogan is cracking down on Kurds in Turkey while supporting them in Syria. They claim this to be an unintentional precursor towards eventual empowerment of PKK that might lead to establishing of an independent Kurd state – something that the United States and Israel desire. An example of this rhetoric can be found in the pamphlets “Erdoğan Kürt Devleti” and “Sen Onları Birlik Sanırsın, Oysa Kalpleri Paramparçadır”.
Another often-quoted pamphlet is “Güvenli Bölge” that describes the existence of a Turkish-Russian project in Syria as a project aimed at creating an alliance between the Syrian government and the “Sahwists” of Hayyat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) to counter Islamic State presence in Syria and Iraq. One of the main takes in the propaganda against Turkey targets its alleged support for the HTS rule in the Idlib region which is evident in elaborate pamphlets like “Suriye’deki Sahavatlar” which also lashes out at jihadist leader Muhammad al-Jawlani. This is the topic where pro-IS Turkish language propaganda and ISKP propaganda converges and draw parallels between HTS and the Taliban, comparing actions of Turkey with the United States as well as other regional countries supporting the two jihadist entities.
The main hints of ISKP linguistics and ideas emerge in publications that describe HTS as a project of Turkey and the US, financed by other countries in the region to hunt down and eliminate other jihadist groups. It is here that HTS is mostly compared to the Taliban and Pakistan as entities empowered by the west to root out other regional jihadist movements – an idea that lies at the heart of the literature and other products published and broadcasted by IS’s Khorasan chapter regularly.
Propaganda against Turkey is also rampant in official ISKP channels in multiple languages including Pashto and English where the Khorasan chapter mentions blames Turkey as a country similar to Pakistan in allegedly adopting façade of an Islamic government while actually being staunch ally of the US. In a book published in September 2021 by Al-Azaim media on the Pugwash organization, it also argues that the US is pushing the Taliban to adopt a “secular” form of government such as the one in place in Turkey which, they claim, is “ideologically” occupied by the US. This section of the book was later translated into English and featured in the 12th issue of ISKP magazine Voice of Khorasan in order for it to cater to a larger audience. The Turkish version of the publication was shared by Meydan Medya, as well.
In the 22nd issue of Voice of Khorasan magazine featured an article on the deadly Kaahramanmaras Earthquake that struck Turkey in February 2023. In the group’s narration of the event, the calamity was a “punishment from god” for Turkey’s adaptation of an un-Islamic behavior including it being a member of the NATO alliance, its support for HTS, and its relations with Iran and Russia.
Voice of Khorasan also published a detailed article on the fall of the Ottoman Empire and its “deviant path from Islam” in the 15th issue of the English language magazine. The article is a translation of a famous short book written by Salafi scholar Sheikh Nasir al-Fahd — imprisoned in Saudi Arabia since 2003 — that harshly criticized the former Empire as one of the main causes for the spread of Sufi practices in the Islamic world as well as for conducting a war against Salafis. ISKP considers Turkey as a Sufi country at its core and alleges it of combining secular and Sufi ideas as a cocktail of un-Islamic characters in the form its constitution. With this argument, ISKP tries to unify linkages between its war against Sufism in Afghanistan and its criticism of Turkey while mixing both religion and politics.
In its politico-religious discourse ISKP has linked both — heritage of the Ottoman Empire and modern Turkey’s original secular system — in a single article published in the 13th issue of its Pashto language magazine Khorasan Ghag in which the writer argues that the Ottoman Empire was not worthy of the title of the Caliphate for preferring Sufism over Salafism and hunting down the latter. While taking a stern approach, the writer has also compared Mustafa Kemal “Ataturk” with Shah Shuja of Afghanistan, whom ISKP labels as a ‘British puppet’.
ISKP Criticizes Taliban-Turkey Relations
The same article in Khorasan Ghag further claims that the Taliban are following Mustafa Kemal’s model of governance; as Ataturk was given control of Turkey after the First World War by the US, Great Britain, and France, while the Taliban struck a similar deal to control Afghanistan. In a historic back and forth, it also blames the Taliban of following Erdogan’s strategy of being an opportunistic government that bases its ties with the US, Russia, Israel, and Iran on its temporary needs. Across its eleven pages, the article claims that Turkey is also leading the US plan of eradicating Islam from Afghanistan to shape a secular, democratic model for the Taliban to adopt instead. It also gives example of Turkey’s offer for protection during evacuation of foreign missions in Kabul, a process that began during the withdrawal of NATO and US forces from Afghanistan. Quoting it as another example, it refers to the October 2022 international conference of “Islamic Scholars Meeting”, where the Taliban’s spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid expressed satisfaction over Turkey-Taliban relations. The ISKP ideologue argues that Turkey is lobbying for the recognition of the Taliban and is bringing in investments into the country and that the Taliban aim to suppress the Islamic State’s “Caliphate” at the request of Turkey in the same manner as Ataturk who abolished the Ottoman Caliphate at the request of the British government.
A similar narrative was offered in the second issue of the Arabic language magazine Sawt-al Khorasan, published in late December 2022, which featured an article that draws a parallel between Pakistan in Afghanistan and Turkey in Syria, arguing that in the manner the former supported the Taliban against ISKP, the latter supports HTS against IS.
The most important source of anti-Turkey rhetoric provided by ISKP though, is published in the Uzbek language by Al-Azaim Uzbek and constitutes the larger chunk of ISKP propaganda against Turkey overall. This category is specifically devised for linking together all targets of ISKP, thus including the Taliban and regional countries — mainly Pakistan and Iran — as well as Turkey and HTS in Syria and, ultimately Uzbekistan as well.
In a 29-minute-long audio message by Al-Azaim, Turkish-Israeli relations in the fields of security and economic cooperation is criticised. The speakers verbatim is aimed against Erdogan, claiming that while he is portraying his own government as Islamic, he actually follows the path of secularism at the behest of the US, in exchange receiving economic aid and laxities for fighting against IS in Syria as a NATO member. He denounces the “hypocrisy” of Arab and Turkish regimes and their support of the Palestinian government, linked to the “Sahwa” and the “Ihkwan”.
Uzbek jihadist ideologues like Sadiq Samarqandi and Abdulloh Zufar are criticized for endorsing Erdogan’s operations in Syria, pointing out links between Turkey and HTS in Idlib. A similar discourse is formulated around the figure of HTS ideologue Farouk Shami, regarded as a top propagandist for the Sahwa and Turkey. The audio also mentions Saudi Arabia and Qatar, particularly Saudi Salafi cleric Abdullah al-Muhaysini. HTS is also criticized for having relations with Iran, accusing them of spreading Iranian influence in the region by accepting economic projects.
Uzbekistan is also directly targeted in the audio, with the same arguments as Turkey, stating that if Israel was able to win the favor of Turkey, it will eventually achieve the same with Uzbekistan.
The speaker goes on to say that leaders of certain jihadist movements are as fascinated by Erdogan’s “deceptive” rhetoric as the mainstream Islamic ideologues while referring to Uzbek jihadist factions in Idlib Katiba Tavhid va Jihod, which is now integrated into HTS’s military structure, as having fallen for Erdogan’s propaganda. Ultimately — the speaker argues — all these organizations are Sahwa and Al-Qaida in their creed and practices.
Another hour-and-a-half-long audio statement published by Al-Azaim Uzbek in May 2022 addresses a series of topics, again including Turkey. This audio in specific argues that Turkey has deviated from Islam under the influence of the US and the United Kingdom, which are now also trying to secularise Syria and Iraq through Turkey. The speaker accuses Turkey of supporting the West in tackling jihadist movements in Mali, Nigeria, and Somalia, while at the same time, cooperating with Uzbekistan’s intelligence agencies to hunt down IS Central Asian militants in Turkey and Syria.
Abdulloh Zufar is also specifically targeted as an example of the media and propaganda war against IS carried out by religious scholars working for Western governments and allies, alongside scholars such as Yusuf Davron and Sodiq Samarqand.
Assessment
Given the significant amount of hostile IS propaganda against Turkey, the possibility of an attack on Turkish interests inside Afghanistan and, perhaps, other regions including an attack within Turkey itself cannot be ruled out. Going by the convergence of multiple IS groups at the propaganda front, the attack could, possibly, be spearheaded by IS Khorasan Province in specific or groups affiliated with IS’s other regional chapters in general. In an alarmingly prevalent pattern has recently emerged where ISKP begins talking more frequently about a nation, increases the depth and nuance of its criticism, and then proceeds to attack the country’s interests. This trend was discernible with ISKP threatening and then following through in striking the interests of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Russia, Pakistan, and China. Diplomatic missions and foreign nationals are the prime targets of these attacks that draw significantly higher media attention than attacks on local adversaries.
In the month of May last year, following a considerable increase in ISKP propaganda featuring Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, the group carried out two symbolic attacks from Afghanistan into the Uzbek border city of Termez and against a Tajik military base next to the Afghan border city of Hairatan. Later, in September 2022, an ISKP suicide bomber detonated at the Russian embassy in Kabul after frequently describing Russia as one of IS main enemies for its support of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in its incremental propaganda drive. The operation was followed in December 2022 by another attack against the Pakistani embassy in Kabul, after the group had promised to take action against Pakistan in revenge for supporting the Taliban. The apex was reached in mid-December 2022 when two ISKP operatives assaulted the Longan Hotel in Kabul, where several Chinese nationals were staying, with the specific intent of targeting them, after a long propaganda campaign against China which started in late 2021 after Chinese diplomats started to negotiate with the Taliban.
Turkey is viewed by the jihadist organization as a strong supporter of the Taliban — ISKP’s primary enemy in Afghanistan — and also part of the greater anti-IS coalition and backer of other Islamic State enemies such as HTS in the Middle East. For IS, an attack on Turkish interests in Afghanistan would serve as a reprisal in relation to this complex web of grievances they attach to the country and its security policies.
This piece is collaborative research by Militant wire and The Khorasan Diary.