![\"\"](\"https:\/\/thekhorasandiary.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/05\/1.jpg\")
Then, he argued that the TTP did not start hostilities with the Pakistani state but it was the latter that initiated a crackdown on jihadist movements supporting the Afghan Taliban against the US and its allies during the US-led War on Terror. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
Noor Wali\u2019s main point was that while Pakistan is a Muslim and Islamic state, its system of government was not.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
He accused Pakistan of actively working with the US to kill or capture jihadist leaders, naming Afghan Taliban leaders Mullah Muhammad Akhtar Mansour, Mullah Obaidullah Akhund, Mullah Ustad Yaseer and Pakistani citizen Dr. Aafia Siddique.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The TTP chief also condemned Pakistan for repelling Islamic laws such as the Hudood Ordinance in favour of other “un-Islamic” laws, such as the Transgender Bill.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Noor Wali also argued that the TTP never promised to surrender their weapons in the event of a ceasefire or a political settlement. On the contrary, he said, the TTP feels obligated to continue its struggle against the armed forces in Pakistan and holds them responsible for the plight of the tribal areas and all the issues in Pakistan.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
He recommended that the solution lies in following the Afghan Taliban’s model of insurgency.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Noor Wali\u2019s third and final argument criticized Usmani’s choice of words and the overall sense of his speech, which, he thought, conveyed the idea that the TTP is a “Takfeeri” group. Noor Wali not only rejected this accusation but also claimed that Pakistan is directly responsible for indiscriminate violence against religious scholars and civilians. He argued that the TTP has an accountability body tasked with addressing violations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
At the heart of TTP chief’s speech was a constant reference to the 2004 “consensus fatwa by scholars regarding the Wana Operation.” Throughout the audio, Mehsud stressed that the fatwa was signed by some 500 prominent Islamic scholars. The text, however, only reported 58 of them.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The fatwa centered around four basic points including Pakistan Army\u2019s 2004 Kaloosha Operation in South Waziristan against al Qaeda and Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). It questioned the Pakistan Army\u2019s actions against Muslims, causing many deaths. Furthermore, it deliberated over validity of Islamic funerals for soldiers and local Muslims.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The ongoing debate between the ulema was sparked by a sermon by fiercely radical, jihadi scholar Maulana Abdul Aziz Ghazi of Lal Masjid (Red Mosque) who criticised Pakistan\u2019s governance system and its forces back in December 2022.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
His speech faced resistance from 15 Islamic scholars from different parts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. In a seven-point fatwa issued in January 2023, they rejected the notion of Western democracy but added that individuals should follow state laws that do not contradict provisions of the Holy Quran. It also dismissed armed struggle and revolt against the ruler as a breach of Islamic law.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The 2004 fatwa, however, merits more value as it has the signatures of 500 scholars over the recent seven-point fatwa with only 16 signatures, giving an edge to Noor Wali.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The confrontation extended beyond Noor Wali and Usmani, with the Grand Mufti\u2019s words provoking ferocious reaction from jihadist ideologues.<\/p>\n\n\n\n TTP leader Sheikh Gul Muhammad Bajauri issued a nine-point response to Usmani even before Noor Wali in a 50-minute-long message, criticizing Usmani for publicly discussing TTP-Pakistani scholars\u2019 talks in Kabul. He argued that the meeting was confidential, reminding Usmani that he was himself against audio and video recording of the moot.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Responding to Usmani\u2019s claim that high-ranking Afghan Taliban officials, particularly Sirajuddin Haqqani, opposed TTP\u2019s struggle against Pakistan, Bajauri argued that the Afghan Taliban harboured same animosity towards Pakistan and TTP enjoyed support of their Afghan namesake.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Bajauri criticised Usmani for disapproving of TTP for accidentally killing innocent Muslims while condoning Pakistan’s cooperation with the US in tackling al Qaeda and TTP militants. He specifically referred to July 2022 killing of Ayman al-Zawahiri in Kabul as an example of Pakistan’s collaboration with the US. He is the first senior TTP member to openly acknowledge the former al Qaeda leader’s death.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Bajauri said TTP\u2019s struggle has been sanctioned by other prominent Deobandi religious scholars as he mentioned anti-state comments issued by Mufti Muhammad Fareed, Mufti Kifayatullah, and Maulana Yusuf Ludhianvi.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Bajauri urged Usmani to engage in a new public debate on the legitimacy of the TTP’s armed fight, assuring that the group is willing to step back if proven wrong.<\/p>\n\n\n\n TTP sought to bolster its legitimacy in the debate by referencing Afghan Taliban-affiliated religious scholar Mufti Zahid Azizkhel. Referring to him as the “Grand Mufti” of Afghanistan, the TTP shared an 8-minute audio recording of Azizkhel responding to Usmani. The Afghan mufti argued that Pakistan\u2019s governance system is \u201cwesternised\u201d unlike the Afghan Taliban\u2019s emirate, and backed TTP\u2019s narrative of an armed struggle to establish an Islamic regime in Pakistan.<\/p>\n\n\n\n This is not the first time the TTP has relied on Azizkhel to legitimise its discourse.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In October 2022, the group released the first video of a series called “Under Observation”, which aimed to criticise various actors in Pakistani society, including media institutions, the army, and the judiciary. The initial instalment targeted Pakistan’s National Assembly for approving the Transgender Act. It featured sermons from Pakistani religious scholars who opposed to the new bill, as well as a speech by Azizkhel endorsing the TTP’s struggle in Pakistan to enforce Sharia.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The militant group also started sharing an old and out-of-context audio clip of Afghan Taliban Supreme Leader, Mullah Haibatullah Akhundzada recalling that the British attempted to introduce secularism in Afghanistan just as they did in Pakistan. He cited Usmani\u2019s book \u201cTakmilah Fathul Mulhim\u201d which argues that Pakistan\u2019s judicial system is un-Islamic.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The Lal Masjid cleric, who sparked the entire debate, also responded to Usmani\u2019s speech by questioning the Islamic validity of Pakistan\u2019s democratic system. By drawing comparisons to India and US, he argued that if Islamabad\u2019s system is considered Islamic then New Delhi too should be considered Islamic as it retained British-colonial era legal framework. He referenced the works of his father, brother and son to assert that an armed struggle is necessary to establish Islamic law in Pakistan.<\/p>\n\n\n\n A day later, on January 25, independent pro-al Qaeda jihadist Mufti Abu Zar al Burmi joined the debate with a 14-minute sermon on bringing an Afghanistan-like Islamic system to Pakistan. He fully endorsed TTP narrative, advocating for an armed struggle to achieve \u201cpeace\u201d in Waziristan and Afghanistan.<\/p>\n\n\n\n It isn\u2019t the first time al Burmi has criticised Usmani\u2019s views. Back in 2019, al Burmi dedicated three audio lessons to commenting on Usmani\u2019s views on apostasy among Islamic rulers. He respectfully disagreed with Usmani\u2019s views, expressed in Takmilah Fathul Mulhim, by quoting al Qaeda strategist Abu Musab al Suri.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Months later, al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) affiliated author Maulana Muthanna Hassan joined the discussion with a 39-page booklet released first by pro-AQIS media outlet al Ummat Nashriati Idara, then Nawa-e-Ghazwa-e-Hind. He argued that Pakistan\u2019s economic and political instability directly results from the prevalence of secularism and actions of a Westernised political elite. He said religious scholars in Pakistan should back TTP\u2019s armed struggle for implementation of Sharia.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) too jumped on the bandwagon to capitalise on regional developments for gaining prominence and attracting potential supporters. It strongly condemned Pakistan\u2019s religious scholars and governance system in its Pashto magazine Khorasan Ghag. Usmani, in particular, was labelled as \u201cspiritual leader\u201d of all Taliban and identified as one of ISKP\u2019s main adversaries.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Islamic State Pakistan Province (ISPP) too reacted with a 27-page pamphlet presenting a counter-narrative, drawing on the history of the subcontinent. It talked about Islamic Constitution, arguing that there is no difference between constitutions of Pakistan and India. It pointed out the contradiction of allowing armed struggle in Afghanistan but prohibiting it in Pakistan. ISPP also criticised Usmani for condoning Pakistan\u2019s efforts to block Tehreek-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Muhammad movement in Malakand.<\/p>\n\n\n\n ISPP also called out Noor Wali for following Afghan Taliban\u2019s model and moving away from jihad and towards politics and democracy. The language, however, against Noor Wali was not overly harsh. In fact, it critiqued Usmani for not bestowing title of \u201cmufti\u201d upon Noor Wali, arguing that the Pakistani mufti should show respect for a \u201cmujahid\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Interestingly, ISPP called on TTP militants and their chief to repent. It also urged TTP militants to abandon Noor Wali if he continued to follow in Afghan Taliban\u2019s footsteps, while warning against blind adherence [taqleed] to the TTP chief and Pakistani religious scholars. In a bid to gain favour of TTP militants, it also expressed sympathy for tribesmen.<\/p>\n\n\n\n While militants, jihadist ideologues, and radicals attempted to undermine the legitimacy of Usmani’s statements, several prominent Pakistani religious scholars rallied around him.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Prominent religious figures including Council of Islamic Ideology Chairman Dr. Qibla Ayaz, Central Ruet-e-Hilal Committee Chairman Maulana Syed Muhammad Abdul Khabir Azad, Allama Iftikhar Naqvi, and Allama Hussain Akbar had expressed their full support for Paigham-e-Pakistan fatwa \u2013 sanctioned by 1,800 scholars from different sects of Islam in 2018. This fatwa is seen as a crucial exercise for combating violent extremism and terrorism.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Vice-Chancellor of Jamia Darul Aloom Haqqaniya Akora Khattak, Maulana Hamid ul Haq Haqqani said Pakistani Ulema belonging to different sects had unanimously agreed that terrorism and extremism against the state were strictly prohibited, adding that Usmani had their full support.<\/p>\n\n\n\n At a religious convention in February at Darul Uloom Naimiyyah in Karachi, Mufti Muneebur Rehman issued a joint statement with other scholars, categorically rejecting any form of terrorism in the country and declared such acts as contrary to Islam. He specifically termed suicide attacks as \u201charam\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n He explained that although Pakistan\u2019s religious leaders supported Afghanistan\u2019s war against the Soviet Union and US invasions, it is now the duty of the de-facto Afghan Taliban government to prevent anti-Pakistan elements from planning attacks against Pakistan. He reaffirmed scholars\u2019 unwavering support for the Pakistani state. <\/p>\n\n\n\n Principal of Lahore\u2019s Jamia Naeemia, Maulana Raghib Naeemi, reiterated his father, Maulana Sarfaraz Ahmed Naeemi\u2019s stand of opposing TTP\u2019s armed attacks against the state back in 2008. Sarfaraz Ahmed had convened a gathering of Ulema from different sects under the umbrella of Muttahida Ulema Council to issue a fatwa declaring suicide bombings \u201charam\u201d and \u201cnajaiz\u201d [illegitimate]. He too was killed in a suicide attack in 2009.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Raghib said Usmani\u2019s words were praised by those attending the Paigham-e-Pakistan conference and expressed concern for their safety. He said, although the Ulema spoke for the state, their security was often overlooked, leaving them exposed to militant threats. <\/p>\n\n\n\n He dismissed the notion that TTP would consider Usmani\u2019s advice, reasoning that militant outfits in the current Pakistani landscape are \u201cfull of themselves.\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n This exchange of fatwas will likely escalate and provoke a backlash from anti-state jihadist ideologues in Pakistan as they potentially undermine Usmani\u2019s credibility and prominence.<\/p>\n\n\n\n While Usmani is respected in the region, even among jihadist scholars, this latest confrontation may stain his reputation within the jihadist circles. His strong stance has elicited a firm yet respectful reaction from jihadist groups.<\/p>\n\n\n\n But, Usmani\u2019s criticism from jihadist scholars is not unprecedented. Some pro-al Qaeda Islamists have openly challenged him before.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In 2013, Pakistani scholar and al Qaeda sympathiser Maulvi Abdul Jabbar Siddique wrote against Usmani and his brother Mufti Rafi Usmani, criticising them for siding with the state.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The writer framed arguments similar to those highlighted by the TTP in the latest debate, pointing out that both the Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan reject the system of democracy. The pamphlet extensively cited another 2011 work by Sheikh Muhammad Isa al-Ansari, who wrote a 254-page book that analytically rebutted Usmani’s views on the Islamic system of politics. In framing its criticism of Usmani, al-Ansari also quoted one of former leaders of AQIS, Maulana Asim Umar’s books, published in 2010, which lashed out against religious scholars who serve the interests of “tyrannical rulers,” referring to the episode of Imam Abu Hanifa’s refusal to accept Umayyad Caliph Abu Jafar al-Mansoor’s offer for the position of Chief of Judges.<\/p>\n\n\n\n However, such instances of criticism were limited and confined to single ideologues. In contrast, this latest confrontation saw the participation of the top leadership of the TTP, as well as citations of speeches by the Taliban’s supreme leader.<\/p>\n\n\n\n This considerably affected Usmani’s standing among militants and supporters, as witnessed in the comments written on several channels of TTP supporters.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The collateral effect of the delegitimising campaign against Usmani is the boost in ISKP and ISPP propaganda.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Apart from the issue of Khorasan Ghag and the ISPP pamphlet, Usmani was explicitly targeted in ISPP’s Urdu language magazine Yalghar, as an article lashed out against the Paigham-e-Pakistan fatwa, arguing that Usmani was endorsing the concept of “Islamic democracy.”<\/p>\n\n\n\n More recently, the fourth issue of the same magazine featured Usmani again, extending criticism towards all Pakistani scholars. <\/p>\n\n\n\n As several TTP supporters expressed resentment over Usmani’s remarks, using language similar to that of ISKP, there is a risk that disgruntled militants might join or collaborate with ISKP and ISPP for new attacks.<\/p>\n\n\n\n On the other side, confronting a senior religious scholar such as Mufti Taqi Usmani, who enjoys a stature of global prominence within the Muslim world might undermine the TTP on core ideological grounds, compromising their so-called narrative building. Traditionally, Usmani is considered a \u201cteacher\u201d to many leading jihadists within TTP, Al-Qaeda, and Afghan Taliban. His prominence became evident on the occasion of his official visit to Afghanistan last year and the warm welcome extended by top Afghan Taliban leadership, including the Prime Minister, who rarely meets visiting delegations. Due to his status, he had been able to confront jihadist militants publicly and bluntly when otherwise, other scholars feared for their lives in case of criticism of such groups.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" The last two weeks of January were marked by a heated verbal confrontation between religious scholars, jihadist ideologues, and militant leaders. This was sparked by remarks made by Pakistan\u2019s Grand Mufti, Taqi Usmani, regarding the \u201clegitimacy\u201d of armed struggle in Pakistan to implement Sharia.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":62,"featured_media":29758,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"inline_featured_image":false},"categories":[25],"tags":[474,123,472,470,113,103,420,102],"aioseo_notices":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/thekhorasandiary.com\/new\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/29748"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/thekhorasandiary.com\/new\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/thekhorasandiary.com\/new\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/thekhorasandiary.com\/new\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/62"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/thekhorasandiary.com\/new\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=29748"}],"version-history":[{"count":8,"href":"https:\/\/thekhorasandiary.com\/new\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/29748\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":29776,"href":"https:\/\/thekhorasandiary.com\/new\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/29748\/revisions\/29776"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/thekhorasandiary.com\/new\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/29758"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/thekhorasandiary.com\/new\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=29748"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/thekhorasandiary.com\/new\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=29748"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/thekhorasandiary.com\/new\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=29748"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}![\"\"](\"https:\/\/thekhorasandiary.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/05\/3-703x1024.jpg\")
Reaction by Jihadist Groups:<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n
![\"\"](\"https:\/\/thekhorasandiary.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/05\/4.jpg\")
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Reactions by Pakistani Religious Scholars:<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n
Assessment and Implications:<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n