On August 17 2022, a huge explosion targeted the Siddiqiya Mosque in Kabul, claiming more than 20 lives and injuring over 30 others, including the khatib, Maulvi Amir Muhammad Kabuli. While no group claimed responsibility for the attack, Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) supporters rejoiced over the death of Kabuli on several Telegram channels, and there are hints that the group is the primary suspect behind this attack.
Reportedly, Maulvi Amir Muhammad Kabuli was a Hanafist scholar who followed Sufi practices belonging to the Saifi Tariqa, an offshoot of the Naqshbandiyya.
The Saifiyya was founded by Pir Saifur Rehman around the 1950s in Afghanistan. He was an Alim (teacher) originally from Nangarhar who had been initiated into Naqshbandi, Qadiri, Suhrawardi, and Chishti orders, and who taught in Kunduz before moving into former FATA in the late 70s. Like many Sufi orders, the Saifiyya believes in mystical practices. Since ISKP views Sufism as polytheism and apostasy, the group considers Sufis as their enemies.
Indeed, in the recent past, ISKP has carried out attacks against the Saifi community. Particularly, on May 14, 2021, the group bombed the Haji Bakhshi Mosque in the Shakardara district of Kabul, killing Mufti Noman along with 10 followers and wounding 40 other people. Later on May 16, ISKP issued a fatwa through Al-Azaim titled “Kill these polytheists wherever you find them!”. The twenty pages long statement described Mufti Noman as a secular, democratic, polytheist Sufi who supported both the Republic and the Taliban, disseminating Sufi practices in Afghanistan.
The text is divided into two parts. The first one legitimizes the assassinations of religious figures on the basis that many of them sold Islam and embraced Western democracy, introducing it in Afghanistan, and endorsing Western-style education. At the same time, these scholars support the killing of innocent Muslims and state that it is no longer possible to wage jihad.
In the eyes of ISKP, Sufism is spearheading this “US project” and it is financed by the West, which set up Deewa Radio for this particular reason and which relies on people like Pakistani Pashto poet Sardar Ali Takkar to influence the minds of Muslims.
The second part of the text is a long tirade against Saifis, starting from extracts from the Saifi text Hidayatul Salikin written by Pir Saifur Rehman. ISKP accuses Saifis of establishing promiscuous parties in the name of mystical ecstasy, even kidnapping the wives of their own followers. However, accusations were more political than religious.
As Sufis are considered tools of the US, Mufti Noman and other religious scholars were accused of paving the way for the Taliban to take control of Afghanistan in accordance with the US. Indeed, ISKP argued that Mufti Noman’s brother was a commander of the Taliban in Kunduz and that even though Mufti Noman was initially a supporter of the Republic, he ultimately sided with the Taliban over the US instruction. He thus advocated for the establishment of an Islamic democracy under the guise of an Emirate.
However, Mufti Noman was not the only religious figure targeted in the text. The fatwa pronounced takfeer (ex-communication from Islam of one Muslim by another) on veteran Salafi mujahid Abdul Rab Rasul Sayyaf, Hizb-e-Islami leader Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, Jamiat-e-Islami affiliated Maulana Ayaz Niazi, Jamiat-e-Islah Chairman Muhammad Atif, and all the Taliban. While ISKP in subsequent publications reiterated that Sayyaf and Hekmatyar are outside the fold of Islam, ISKP did assassinate both Ayaz Niazi in June 2020 and Muhammad Atif in February 2021. A similar fate happened to another Jamiat-e-Islah leader Mawlawi Abdul Salam Abed, who was killed in December 2021.
ISKP LITERATURE AGAINST SUFISM
Sufism has been frequently targeted in ISKP publications, as the group legitimized attacks against Sufi shrines with an ideological framework that aims at criticizing both the trend of Islam as well as the Taliban who are following it. Thus, many ISKP texts proclaimed these practices of Sufis as deviant and deemed it their responsibility to orchestrate attacks on them.
For instance, in its fatwa “Masjid Al-Zarrar”, published in July 2022, ISKP specifically said that along with other minorities, it is obligatory for the group to target Sufi places of worship and, consequently, mosques and shrines frequented by the Taliban. The text argues that these places of worship serve both as ideological and military strongholds for the Taliban to perpetuate their rule in Afghanistan.
In “The Current Taliban or…?”, a 360-page long book published by ISKP in 2018 that represented the main collection of anti-Taliban publications until 2021, the writer argues that in 2014, then Taliban Emir Mullah Akhtar Mohammed Mansour depicted its war against ISKP as a war between Sufism and Salafism, pointing at ISKP interpretation of the war against the Taliban, which does not differentiate between Sufism and Taliban movement/interim government.
This topic was subsequently expanded in ISKP current magnum opum on the Taliban: “Golden Pages on the Nationalist Taliban”, written by top ISKP ideologue Abu Saad Khorasani and published in August 2021. A chapter is specifically dedicated to the Taliban’s acceptance of Sufi practices, outlining other targets for ISKP, including Saifis as well as other groups who follow theological schools of Islam such as Jahmiyyah, Maturidiyyah, Qadiriyyah, and Murjiyyah. Quoting a speech given by Taliban’s supreme leader Mullah Haibatullah Akhundzadah, which harshly lashed out against Salafis, Wahhabis, and Panjpiris, another chapter argues that the Taliban are accepting only Deobandis and Barelvis, following the teachings of Sufi pirs.
It is important to note that since late 2022, several pro-ISKP accounts on social media platforms have launched a slandering campaign against Taliban’s supreme leader Mullah Haibatullah Akhundzadah, maintaining that he himself is a follower of Pir Saifur Rehman, thus discrediting him as legitimate “Amirul Momineen”. These ISKP supporters exacerbated their slandering campaign after Taliban’s Minister of High Education Neda Mohammad Nadim claimed that Mullah Haibatullah Akhundzadah is a Sufi Pir.
More recently, two books published by ISKP delved into more details on Barelvi and Deobandi trends of Islam, while legitimizing future attacks by the organization against their followers. In early January 2023, ISKP writer Nasiruddin Kabuli published a book titled “Taliban: Proxy Fighters of Infidel Intelligence Agencies”, which accuses Pakistan of fostering Barelvi Islam and Sufism in Afghanistan and among the Taliban in order to counter ISKP, along with the US, citing the fatwa issued in May 2021.
The second book titled “An Introduction to the Deobandi Group” was published in late December 2022 by the unofficial pro-ISKP media institute Mubarzeen Media and is a direct attack on the Deobandi school of thought. Throughout the book, the writer Mufti Kheiruddin Hanafi lashes out against all Islamic movements in Central Asia and in the Subcontinent which maintain they are following the teachings of Imam Abu Hanifa, but in fact, according to ISKP takfeeri ideology, have misinterpreted his word. These movements include Barelvis, Panjpiris, Tablighis, and Deobandis, whom ISKP does not consider Hanafis but followers of Indian Sufis.
More worryingly, however, the most ferocious, ongoing effort by ISKP aimed at legitimizing its campaign against Sufism in the region is the new audio series announced in its Pashto language magazine Khorasan Ghag, issue 10, which was published in September 2022. Shortly after the announcement, ISKP mouthpiece Al-Azaim Media started to regularly publish audio lessons that analytically discussed Sufism and ISKP’s refutation of it.
Until early February 2023, the group has released 30 episodes, and each episode is dedicated to different topics in Sufism. ISKP has criticized the different practices and customs adopted by the different schools of thought in these audios. Compared to previous publications by the group, this audio series is more pervasive and addresses numerous topics pertaining to Sufism, with the aim of arousing indignation for Sufi practices and triggering a violent backlash by Muslims who do not follow Sufism.
The recurrent theme in all audio lessons is the figure of the Pir, who is described as the main responsible for upholding Sufi practices in the region, outlining him as a mandatory target for ISKP operations.
Another key aspect of the audio series is the frequent attacks against the Naqshbandiyya tariqa. For instance, in the eleventh and twelfth audio lessons, the Naqshbandiyya school of thought is criticized for its practices and the status it bestows on its Pirs. This is significant as many Taliban are followers of the Naqshbandiyya, such as current Taliban Minister of Interior Khalifa Sirajuddin Haqqani, thus creating a parallelism between the Sufi movement and the Taliban.
Most recently, in February 2023, ISKP published the fourth issue of its Arabic language magazine Sawt Khorasan, where a whole detailed article is dedicated to the ongoing campaign against Deobandis and Sufis in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India, hence expanding its narrative among the Arab public. The article is a brief summary of how ISKP framed the parallel between Taliban and Sufis, with the ultimate goal of presenting the Taliban as a Sufi movement that is fighting a war against other currents of Islam and Salafis in the region. The article is actually part of an ongoing series, which now counts up to three articles criticizing Sufism and different saints and prominent figures of several tariqas, including Sheikh ul Islam Hussein Ahmed Madani, in the Sawt Khorasan March issue.
On a similar level, the April issue of Sawt Khorasan featured an interview with ISKP ideologue Abu Fateh Khorasani, who delved into a conspiracy theory of a plot staged by Shias and Sufis to annihilate Islam; according to Abu Fateh, there is no substantial difference between Shias and Sufis, hence connecting them to the Taliban as their protectors. Furthermore, in different issues of Sawt Khorasan, an ISKP writer named Inayatullah Parwani wrote articles with the specific intent of outlining future targets for ISKP attacks; these include Shia and Sufi shrines across Afghanistan, detailing their history and why it is crucial to target them.
CONNECTIONS WITH THE PAST
The sectarian conflict that involves the Saifis has two-decade-old roots in the tribal district of Khyber, where Pir Saifur Rehman settled after leaving Afghanistan and entered a fierce competition with other propagandists and their groups, namely Haji Namdar and Mufti Munir Shakir. The first one was the head of the hisbah (vigilante) group Amar Bil Maroof, while the second was a Deobandi preacher from Hangu. They engaged Pir Saifur Rehman in an FM radio station battle, declaring takfeer on each other. Ultimately, Mufti Munir Shakir founded Lashkar-e-Islam with Mangal Bagh – who was killed in January 2021, while Pir Saifur Rehman formed Ansarul Islam in 2006, starting to clash with each other. Mangal Bagh subsequently collaborated with ISKP between 2014-2015, while both the groups took refuge in the Achin and Nyazan districts of Nangarhar province, Afghanistan.
The conflict did not remain limited to Lashkar-e-Islam and Ansarul Islam. In an interview conducted with Jamaat-ul-Ahrar’s (JuA) magazine Ihya-e-Khilafat in September 2013, late TTP commander Omar Khalid Khurasani narrated the war the TTP had started in the same year against Ansarul Islam in Khyber, accusing the group of spreading its presence into Orakzai with the support of the Pakistani government.
FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS
ISKP has a long history of targeting Sufis, not only in Afghanistan but also in Pakistan. For instance, in November 2016, a suicide bomber blew himself up at Shah Noorani’s shrine in Khuzdar, while in October 2017, another suicide bomber killed several people at the Dargah Fatehpur in Jhal Magsi – eight months after another major attack hit the shrine of Lal Shahbaz Qalandar in Sehwan Sharif in Sindh.
ISKP has shaped a robust narrative that draws a parallel between the Taliban and Sufis, stating that the Taliban are grave-worshippers, wear amulets just like Sufis, and are polytheists. For this reason, the group unleashed a sectarian war against those scholars and religious figures who are close to the Taliban. One of the most significant of these attacks targeted an extremely important ideologue of the Taliban, Shaikh Rahimullah Haqqani. On August 11 2022, an explosion in Kabul targeted his seminary, killing Rahimullah, his brother Maulvi Naqeebullah and several guards. Hours later, ISKP took claim for the attack, stating that one of its fighters, Khaled Logari, carried out an istishhadi (martyrdom) operation inside the seminary. The group then issued a second detailed statement describing how Khaled Logari bypassed all security checks of the Taliban and detonated his explosive jacket inside the office of Sheikh Rahimullah.
As The Khorasan Diary initially reported, Khaled Logari is believed to have hidden the explosive inside his prosthetic limbs, as a video of the dead attacker circulating on pro-Taliban social media also suggested.
On November 17 2022, ISKP claimed to have assassinated Qari Najibullah Azizi, the new imam of the Siddiqiya mosque in Kabul which was targeted in August.
A direct example of the dangerous pervasiveness of this anti-Sufi narrative is the recent attack in Faizabad, Badakhshan, which resulted in the killing of Taliban high-ranking official Mawlawi Abdul Haq Omar, provincial police chief of Badakhshan, in December 2022. ISKP claimed this operation, adding in its Arabic language weekly newsletter al-Naba, issue 371, that Abdul Haq was killed in revenge for the closure of Salafi religious schools in Badakhshan by the Taliban because they were countering Sufism in the province.
On the other hand, as in the case of Muhammad Kabuli, other operations have remained unclaimed. An attack conducted in Kunduz in April 2022 that targeted the khanaqa of Maulvi Sikandar bears the marks of ISKP, given the fact that the group has been highly active in the Imam Sahib district of Kunduz. On September 2 2022, an explosion in the Gazargah mosque in Herat killed prominent pro-Taliban religious figure Mawlawi Mujeebur Rehman al-Ansari. He had been frequently featured in ISKP propaganda in the months before his death. On July 11 2022, ISKP mouthpiece Al-Azaim Foundation published a 62-page point-by-point reply to the declaration of the Grand Ulema Jirga where Mawlawi Ansari was specifically mentioned as a “bad scholar”. Similarly, on July 17 2022, an ISKP video dedicated to the operation targeting Kabul’s Grand Ulema Jirga also threatened Mawlawi Ansari by excommunicating him from Islam and promising revenge for his support of the Taliban. This attack too went unclaimed; however, days later, the Tajik arm of Al-Azaim issued a post which indirectly claimed responsibility for the assassination of Mawlawi Ansari.
In the near future, more attacks against such targets might continue to occur, even if not officially claimed by ISKP. On November 30 2022, for instance, an explosion occurred in Aybak madrassa in Samangan province, resulting in the killing of 19 people, including children, and the wounding of 23 others. While the attack went unclaimed, ISKP is the only group that is willing to conduct such attacks, even though not openly taking responsibility for them. Conversely, Islamic State Pakistan Province (ISPP, the branch of ISKP for regions of Pakistan other than KP) has claimed recently two attacks in Bolan, Balochistan, which led to the assassination of two individuals belonging to the Barelvi sect, between February and April 2023, accusing them of being “sorcerers”, a term usually employed by the group to identify Sufis. The clear strategy designed by ISKP Emir Shahab al-Muhajir in his book “War of Nerves” states that in order to avoid losses and for ISKP to thrive in the region, the group needs to create confusion and chaos, fuelling instability and insecurity so as ISKP might continue its war without suffering setbacks.