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Monday, November 25, 2024

An Assessment Of Islamic State’s Threat To Pakistan: Propaganda And Reality

On April 24, the English language branch of Islamic State Khorasan (ISKP) Al-Azaim Media – the official mouthpiece of the outfit – published a new 25-minute-long video titled “The Unrestrained Metastasis within the Body of the Ummah” centred around Pakistan, the video is original in content and was published in the English language with Urdu subtitles, the second of its kind. The latter had been released in December 2022, the first-ever video dedicated uniquely to Pakistan, titled “For the Muslims in the Land of Muhammad Ibn Qasim”.

The new video is a long tirade against Pakistan, particularly focusing on social, economic, and political issues within the country, employing narratives which resemble Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) usual propaganda. While most topics of discussion are similar to the ones featured in the December 2022 video, one particular fragment of the video is disturbingly new. It displays a clip made by an ISKP militant showing Serena Hotel and the Police Facilitation Centre in Islamabad, making direct threats to the city. However, in the clip, the person shooting the video is not visible, as the camera is centred on the two outlined targets.

 

This is not the first time ISKP threatens attacks against Pakistan, as already in December 2022 the group had auspicated terrorist operations in Islamabad, Balochistan, and Punjab by its local sub-branch, Islamic State Pakistan (ISPP), which is responsible for all attacks outside of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Since then, ISPP underwent a moderate surge in attacks in Balochistan, particularly in Mastung and Bolan areas, carrying out a significant suicide attack in Sibi in March 2023 targeting Pakistan’s security forces.

While ISPP has limited capabilities if compared to ISKP, it should be noted that the group usually foreshadows the targets of its future attacks in propaganda releases; the December 2022 video openly recalled the March 2022 suicide attack in Sibi, in the same location where in March the group carried out the suicide attack. The April video also alludes to new specific targets of attacks, including former Prime Minister Imran Khan; current Prime Minister Shahbaz Sharif; senator and JUI leader Maulana Fazlur Rehman; and current Minister of Foreign Affairs Bilawal Bhutto. Additionally, Pakistan’s relations with neighbouring countries are criticized, in primis Afghanistan, Russia, and China. CPEC corridor and Chinese interests are defined as potential targets for the group, as it has already occurred in Afghanistan with ISKP targeting foreign nationals, and carrying out terrorist operations against Russian, Pakistani, and Chinese nationals.

Considering the status of ISPP and its activities, it is possible that the latest threats could have a galvanizing effect on Islamic State supporters in the region. While the status of ISPP is considerably weaker than ISKP, the group does possess the capabilities of carrying out attacks in urban areas, as for previous instances in Peshawar and Sibi. As per the strategy of the group, the latter does not need to carry out frequent and low-profile attacks, but rather concentrating its resources on one single striking terrorist operation. Even if Islamabad might be an ambitious target for the group and outside its short-term plan of operations, the potential risk is not only limited to Islamabad, however; given the apparent foothold that ISPP retains in Balochistan, the group might opt for attacking an easier target in Quetta, Mastung, or Bolan regions.

As a caveat, it should be added that overall, Islamic State’s activities in Afghanistan and Pakistan are experiencing a decline in the last month and during Ramzan; while this is partially imputable to the Taliban’s recent counter-terrorist operations in curbing the group in Afghanistan, ISKP and ISPP are known for undergoing long periods of silence before relaunching new attacks.

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